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Global progress and backsliding on gasoline taxes
and subsidies
Michael L. Ross1*, Chad Hazlett2 and Paasha Mahdavi3
To reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the coming decades, many governments will have to reform their energy policies.
These policies are dicult to measure with any precision. As a result, it is unclear whether progress has been made towards
important energy policy reforms, such as reducing fossil fuel subsidies. We use new data to measure net taxes and subsidies
for gasoline in almost all countries at the monthly level and find evidence of both progress and backsliding. From 2003 to
2015, gasoline taxes rose in 83 states but fell in 46 states. During the same period, the global mean gasoline tax fell by 13.3%
due to faster consumption growth in countries with lower taxes. Our results suggest that global progress towards fossil fuel
price reform has been mixed, and that many governments are failing to exploit one of the most cost-eective policy tools for
limiting greenhouse gas emissions.
S ince the early 2000s, the Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange, the International Energy Agency, the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank have urged
governments to remove subsidies for fossil fuels and instead tax
them at rates that account for their social and environmental
costs1–3. The IMF estimates that global fossil fuel subsidies—
including social and environmental costs—reached US$5.3 trillion
in 2015, equivalent to 6.5% of global GDP (gross domestic
product)4. The removal of fossil fuel subsidies is widely regarded
as one of the most cost-effective ways for governments to meet
their commitments under the Paris climate agreement to curtail
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions5,6. At the same time, reduced
subsidies and higher taxes can generate local benefits by reducing
road congestion, traffic fatalities, and local air pollution from
nitrogen oxide, ozone, and fine particulates7.
It is unclear, however, whether governments have been adopting
these recommendations. Self-reporting by governments is often
incomplete and unreliable. Many taxes and subsidies are indirect,
or hidden in the budgets of state-owned enterprises; moreover, the
real value of taxes and subsidies changes over time due to inflation
and currency fluctuations. Some countries announce reforms but
either fail to enact them or nullify their impact with countervailing
policies, as in the case of Brazil8. Others try to remove gasoline
subsidies quietly to avoid dissent: according to news reports, since
2006 attempts to raise gasoline prices have been followed by
protests in at least 19 countries, including Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina
Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan,Mozambique,Myanmar,Nicaragua,Niger,
Nigeria, Uganda and Yemen.
The taxes and subsidies that governments place on energy reflect
their efforts to reduce GHG emissions from fossil fuels9. Yet without
a consistent way to measure these taxes and subsidies, we cannot
know much about these efforts and whether they are changing over
time; nor can we know whether the world as a whole is making
progress towards fossil fuel price reform. Better measures of energy
policies can help observers track the climate change mitigation
efforts of governments—including their adherence to the pledges
they made in conjunction with the Paris climate agreement—
particularly if the measures are comprehensive, based on observ-
able data, replicable, and can be applied to all countries9. Consis-
tent measures of fossil fuel price policies will also help scholars
study the conditions that foster or impede politically difficult
energy reforms10–12.
We use monthly data on retail gasoline prices in 157 countries
from 2003 to 2015 to calculate the implicit net tax or subsidy that
governments place on a litre of gasoline. These countries contain
97.1% of the world population and represent 98.2% of all GHG
emissions. Our analysis shows that from the first half of 2003 to
the first half of 2015, net gasoline taxes rose in 83 countries, with
significant gains in China, Brazil and Indonesia. Net taxes fell or
subsidies rose in 46 states, including many oil-exporting countries
in the Middle East, North Africa and Latin America. At a global
level, the unweighted mean gasoline tax across all countries in our
sample rose from 42.8 US cents to 50.9 US cents, equivalent to
a 1.44% compound annual growth rate (CAGR). Since countries
vary widely in their gasoline consumption, however, this figure does
not reveal the global per-litre average tax. Moreover, from 2003
to 2012, the final year for which consumption data are available,
consumption grew more quickly in low-tax countries than high-
tax countries. Using a consumption-weighted measure to reflect the
true per-unit level of taxation, we find that the implicit global mean
tax fell from 27.9 US cents to 24.2 US cents, a CAGR decline of
1.18%. Even though a majority of countries reformed their gasoline
taxes, progress towards higher taxes at a global level was thwarted
by a shift in consumption towards countries that had subsidies or
lower taxes.
Measuring gasoline taxes and subsidies
All governments either tax or subsidize the consumption of fossil
fuels, but many of these taxes and subsidies are difficult to observe
or infer. Coal taxes and subsidies, for example, are exceptionally
hard to determine since in many countries coal is sold directly
to government-owned utilities through long-term contracts rather
than through retail markets; any subsidies may be hidden in the
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price of electricity11. It is also hard to determine the supply cost for
coal, since there is no single international reference price. Without
either the supply cost or the retail price, taxes and subsidies are very
difficult to measure.
Our study focuses on gasoline taxes and subsidies, which can
be more readily measured: gasoline is sold directly to consumers
in all countries, which gives it an observable retail price; country-
to-country differences in gasoline quality are relatively small; and
there is effectively a single world reference price. Until now, data
on gasoline prices have been limited to a single price every two
years for most countries, which is too infrequent to observe many
policy changes13.
We collected data on local gasoline retail prices for 157 countries
from January 2003 to June 2015 using both primary and secondary
sources. We included all sovereign states whose populations were
greater than one million in 2012, except for four countries for
which we could not locate reliable data: Cuba, Eritrea, North Korea
and Turkmenistan. For 46 countries our coverage is temporally
incomplete for the full time series, with datamissing for 1,067 (4.5%)
of the 23,550 country-months. A full list of countries, along with the
number of country-month observations for each case, is found in
Supplementary Table 1.
Primary documents were obtained from national governments
and found on websites maintained by ministries of finance, com-
merce, trade, communications, transportation, natural resources,
petroleum, energy, and mining; central statistical agencies; cen-
tral banks; energy regulatory bodies; state-owned oil companies,
including oil refining companies; and official government de-
crees and public announcements. In 17 countries we employed
local researchers to obtain primary data that were not other-
wise accessible.
Secondary sources included the European Commission, the
International Road Transport Union, the Food and Agriculture
Organization, the Famine Early Warning System, CITAC Africa,
the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, and
documents from the IMF and World Bank. Whenever possible
we cross-validate price data across multiple sources to alleviate
concerns about measurement bias.
To measure implicit taxes and subsidies we use the price gap
method, which compares the observed retail price in each country
with a global benchmark price14. This method yields a single figure
that represents the net per-unit value of all taxes and subsidies,
both implicit and explicit, and that can be readily compared across
countries and over time. Belowwe refer to these implicitlymeasured
net taxes or subsidies as ‘net taxes’ or ‘net subsidies.’
The price gap method allows us to measure what the IMF
calls ‘pre-tax subsidies’, which represent the difference between the
retail price and the international supply cost; we do not attempt
to estimate ‘post-tax subsidies’, which are defined as the difference
between the retail price and the sum of the international supply cost,
a basic consumption tax, and a Pigouvian tax that offsets the costs of
local pollution, congestion, and carbon emissions4. Hence, the price
gap should be interpreted as a lower-bound estimate of total fossil
fuel subsidies.
Country-level trends
Figure 1 shows country-level gasoline prices for 155 countries in
constant 2015 US dollars (USD). Prices have been omitted for
Somalia and Myanmar, whose exchange rates were unavailable for
most of this period. It also displays the benchmark price, which is
the spot price for conventional refined gasoline at the New York
Harbor, adjusted to account for distribution costs. Net taxes and
subsidies are given by the difference between the retail price and
the benchmark price. States fall into two groups: those above the
benchmark (whose prices indicate net taxes) and those below it
(whose prices indicate net subsidies).
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Figure 1 | Gasoline prices by country and benchmark price trends over
time. Individual country price trends are shown in grey, and the global
benchmark price is plotted in red. Countries fall into two groups: those with
prices above the benchmark (who tax gasoline) and those below it (who
subsidize it). The overall shape of many trend lines is driven by changes in
benchmark price. In general, countries that tax gasoline also allow the price
to fluctuate in tandem with global prices, while those that subsidize
gasoline keep their prices fixed for long periods. All prices are in constant
2015 USD per litre.
Thirty-three countries were subsidizers for at least one 12-month
period from 2003 to 2015, and 9 countries were subsidizers for the
entire period. We classify 22 countries as ‘persistent subsidizers’,
meaning their median price for the 2003–2015 period was below
the median benchmark price (that is, the net tax was negative).
They include Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Ecuador, Egypt,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nigeria,
Oman,Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Trinidad, UnitedArab Emirates,
Venezuela and Yemen. In general these subsidizers kept their
gasoline prices fixed, adjusting them an average of once every 17
months. All of them were economically dependent on oil or natural
gas exports, implying that their low, fixed gasoline prices reflected
political pressure to distribute resource revenues15.
Figure 2 displays changes in net taxes and subsidies at the country
level from the first half of 2003 to the first half of 2015. We find that
net taxes rose in 83 states (above the 45-degree line) and declined
in 46 others (below the 45-degree line). The largest increases
in net taxes were in Argentina, China, Malawi and Yemen; the
biggest drops were in Chad, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad and Venezuela.
Among the 20 largest petroleum-based CO2 emitters, the largest tax
increases were in China and Singapore, while the largest decreases
were in Saudi Arabia and South Korea (Table 1).
The global mean tax on gasoline
When all countries are given equal weight, themean net gasoline tax
averaged across countries rose from 42.8 US cents in the first half of
2003 to 50.9 US cents in the first half of 2015, using constant 2015
USD (Fig. 3). This constitutes an 18.9% increase and is equivalent
to a 1.44% CAGR. Yet these figures do not reveal the global mean
net tax on gasoline, since countries vary in their consumption,
and consumption grew more quickly in countries with subsidies
or low taxes than countries with high taxes (Supplementary Fig. 1
and Supplementary Note 1). When we use a consumption-weighted
measure to correct for these differences, our data show that from the
first half of 2003 to the first half of 2015, the global mean net tax fell
from 27.9 US cents to 24.2 US cents, a drop of 13.3% and a CAGR
decline of 1.18%.
This decline was not an artefact of changes in the price of crude
oil. As a proportion of the benchmark price, the unweighted mean
2
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 Distance from benchmark in the 1st half of 2003 (constant 2015 USD per litre)
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Figure 2 | Net taxes and subsidies by country in 2003 versus 2015. Eighty-three countries increased their net taxes or reduced their net subsidies between
the first six months of 2015 and the first six months of 2003; they are shown in blue and lie above the 45◦ dashed line. By contrast, 46 countries reduced
net taxes or increased net subsidies over the same period, and are shown in dark orange below the 45◦ line. While most countries had net taxes in both
periods (placing them in the upper-right quadrant), 14 countries had subsidies in both periods (placing them in the lower-left quadrant). Just two countries
changed from net taxers to net subsidizers (lower-right quadrant) while two others changed from net subsidizers to net taxers (upper-left quadrant). Text
size is proportional to average gasoline consumption.
price fell from 210% to 192%, and the consumption-weighted price
fell from 172% to 144% (Supplementary Fig. 2). Nor is it an artefact
of our starting point: if we begin our analysis in 2001 or 2005
and end in 2011 or 2015, the unweighted mean net tax still shows
a modest increase (with a positive CAGR ranging from 0.59% to
1.59%), while the consumption-weighted mean net tax still shows
a decline (with a negative CAGR ranging from 0.76% to 2.88%)
(Supplementary Table 2). These patterns are also robust to the use
of alternative benchmark prices (Supplementary Figs 3 and 4 and
Supplementary Note 2).
Regional and G20 trends
When prices are disaggregated by region (Fig. 4), we find the highest
net taxes in Europe andNorthAmerica and the lowest in the oil-rich
Middle East and North Africa. Net taxes in the Middle East rose
slightly over the period, while those in Europe and North America
rose sharply in real terms before dropping after July 2014, when
global oil prices collapsed.
What is surprising is the pair of regions with the second highest
and second lowest net tax levels, respectively, as of June 2015: Africa
and the former Soviet Union. African states have some of the highest
net gasoline taxes in the world and have maintained this position
since at least 2003. States that were part of the Soviet Union, on the
other hand, began the periodwith the lowest real net taxes but began
steadily increasing them after 2003 before dropping sharply after the
2014 oil price crash.
In September 2009, theG20 heads of state agreed to phase out ‘in-
efficient fossil fuel subsidies’16. Even though the agreement called at-
tention to the problem of fossil fuel subsidies, its real-world effect is
not apparent: we find no evidence that it was followed by a rise in the
unweighted mean net gasoline tax across these 20 countries (Fig. 5).
Changes in price fixity
Our data allow us to measure changes in price fixity, meaning the
degree to which governments keep gasoline prices fixed or allow
them to fluctuate with market forces. The World Bank and IMF
generally encourage countries to reform their policies by moving
from fixed to floating prices, in order to reduce market distortions
and avoid subsidies when supply costs rise17. Price fixity helps
explain much of the change in subsidies over time: rising global oil
prices causedmany fixed-price states to become subsidizers between
2003 and 2009, while the drop in global oil prices after mid-2012
caused both the number of subsidizers and the magnitude of their
subsidies to fall18.
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Table 1 | Changes in net taxes in the 20 largest petroleum-
based CO2 emitters.
Rank Country Net tax
2003
Net tax
2015
Change
(US$)
Emissions
1 United States 0.11 0.06 −0.05 2,240
2 China 0.03 0.47 0.43 1,306
3 Japan 0.81 0.70 −0.11 568
4 Russia 0.08 0.07 −0.01 436
5 India 0.40 0.43 0.03 435
6 Brazil 0.50 0.62 0.12 390
7 Saudi Arabia −0.09 −0.40 −0.31 389
8 Germany 1.15 1.03 −0.12 313
9 Canada 0.23 0.28 0.06 291
10 Mexico 0.40 0.40 0.00 263
11 Iran −0.31 −0.29 0.01 256
12 South Korea 0.96 0.84 −0.13 253
13 France 1.06 0.98 −0.08 232
14 Indonesia −0.13 0.00 0.13 229
15 United Kingdom 1.17 1.14 −0.03 202
16 Singapore 1.20 1.36 0.17 190
17 Spain 0.76 0.84 0.07 187
18 Italy 1.10 1.19 0.09 185
19 Australia 0.33 0.45 0.12 138
20 Netherlands 1.24 1.21 −0.03 135
Countries are ranked by total emissions. From the first half of 2003 to the first half of 2015, net
taxes rose in 11 of these countries and fell in 9. China had by far the largest increase in net
taxes, followed by Singapore, Indonesia, Australia and Brazil. The largest decline was in Saudi
Arabia, followed by South Korea, Germany and Japan. All prices are in constant 2015 USD per
litre; CO2 emissions from petroleum are in million metric tonnes in 2012.
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Figure 3 | Net taxes and subsidies over time.When all countries are
weighted equally, average net taxes from 2003 to 2015 slightly rose at a
1.44% compound annual growth rate (shown in brown). If countries are
weighted by their gasoline consumption in each period, thus taking
consumption levels and trends into account, the average net taxes instead
declined at a 1.18% compound annual growth rate (dark blue line).
Individual country tax and subsidy trends are shown in grey.
Yet we also find that fixity reform is rare. From 2003 to 2015
the fraction of states with fixed prices dropped only slightly, from
38.5% to 33.5% (Fig. 6). Only one subsidizer switched from fixed
to floating prices: Nigeria, which switched back to fixed prices after
28 months.
Conclusion
Our high-frequency data can provide policymakers with a compre-
hensive, replicable, and observable measure of progress towards
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Figure 4 | Net taxes and subsidies by region over time. Europe and North
America (gold) had the world’s highest average taxes. The Middle East and
North Africa (blue) had the lowest, and is the only region with average net
subsidies in most time periods. In between were Africa (magenta),
Asia-Pacific (grey), former Soviet Union (black), and Latin America and the
Caribbean (orange). Regional averages are computed monthly by weighting
all countries equally.
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Figure 5 | Net taxes and subsidies in the G20. This figure shows net taxes
and subsidies for each country in the G20 plotted in grey lines, along with
an average across all G20 countries marked in black. The dashed vertical
line marks the September 2009 agreement by the G20 heads of state to
phase out ‘inecient fossil fuel subsidies.’ There was no apparent change in
average trend following the agreement.
fossil fuel price reform in virtually all countries. It should also
help scholars who wish to study topics such as the determinants
of gasoline taxes and subsidies, the conditions under which reform
tends to be successful, the factors that affect the elasticity of gasoline
prices, and how gasoline taxes can affect political, economic, social
and environmental outcomes.
For supporters of fossil fuel tax reform, our study reports amix of
good and bad news: while almost two-thirds of the countries in our
sample increased their net gasoline taxes from 2003 to 2015, global
progress was thwarted by a shift in consumption towards states
that maintain gasoline subsidies or low taxes. Fixity reforms were
virtually non-existent for those countries with persistent subsidies,
where such reforms are most needed. Higher gasoline taxes may
be one of the most cost-effective policy tools for reducing carbon
emissions, but from 2003 to 2015 many governments were reluctant
to adopt them, leading to a global decline in net taxes on the average
litre of consumed gasoline.
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Figure 6 | Price fixity over time.We place countries in one of three
categories indicating how many times their gasoline prices changed over
the previous twelve months: three or fewer (black), four to eight (dark
grey), or nine to twelve (light grey). From 2003 to 2015 there was a small
drop in the proportion of countries with fixed prices and a small rise in
those with fluctuating prices. Shares shown are monthly averages.
Methods
Selection of dates and grades. For countries with data reported more frequently
than monthly intervals (daily, weekly or bi-weekly), we used the price from the
first day or week of the month as the monthly price. When data on multiple
gasoline grades were available we use regular-graded gasoline (typically between
87 and 90 octane) to reflect the type most likely to be purchased by the average
consumer. In countries where the availability of grades changes over time we
selected the grade with the longest coverage. When data were available for
different parts of a country we selected the region that includes the capital city.
Converting local currencies. To convert local currencies to US dollars we use
monthly exchange rates from the IMF International Financial Statistics. For
converting from nominal to real 2015 US dollars we use monthly inflation rates
from the US Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED) Consumer Price Index
for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food and Energy (CPILFESL) series. In
countries that experienced currency changes or revaluations—for example,
Romania (July 2005), Turkey (January 2005), Ghana (August 2007)—all prices
have been back-converted to the more recent currency price. For example, the
Turkish lira was revalued in January 2005 by dividing by 1,000,000 to usher in the
‘Second Turkish lira’. All pre-2005 prices are thus divided by 1,000,000 to be in
Second Turkish lira per litre.
Benchmark prices. To estimate implicit net taxes and subsidies we compute the
gap between the local price and the international benchmark price, less a small
adjustment to account for distribution costs. To simplify our analysis we assume
local distribution costs are fixed for all countries and years at 10 US cents per
litre in constant 2015 US dollars; this estimate is drawn from ref. 19, which uses a
similar figure for the cost of bringing refined gasoline to retailers. Though
distribution and other local costs may vary by location, we expect those
unobserved differences to change slowly, and thus may affect cross-country
comparisons but not within-country comparisons over time.
For our benchmark we use the spot price for conventional refined gasoline at
the New York Harbor as reported by the US Energy Information Administration.
For oil-importing countries, the benchmark price represents the marginal cost of
supplying gasoline to consumers. For oil-producing countries, who in many cases
can supply gasoline to their citizens at a lower cost, the difference between the
retail price and the benchmark represents the opportunity cost to the
government: if it sets a retail price below the international benchmark, it is
forgoing revenue it would otherwise accrue by selling its gasoline at a market
price. In both cases we treat the difference between the retail price and the
benchmark as the net implicit tax or subsidy.
Start and end dates. Six-month averages for 2003 (‘first half 2003’) and 2015
(‘first half 2015’) are computed using prices for January through June, where
available. In countries where one or several of these months are missing, we
instead use the average price for the non-missing months. Alternative start and
end points used in Supplementary Table 2 use the same six-month average
approach to smooth out month-to-month fluctuations.
Calculating price fixity. To measure price fixity we count the number of
month-to-month changes in gas prices, in local currency, over a rolling
twelve-month interval. Countries that changed their prices three or fewer times
over the prior twelve months were coded as having fixed prices, countries with
four to eight changes were coded as transitional, and countries with nine to
twelve changes were coded as having floating prices.
Consumption weighting. We weight implicit net taxes and subsidies by
consumption using data on annual motor gasoline consumption from the US
Energy Information Agency International Energy Statistics. A weight w it
is given by a country’s consumption share, calculated as the total consumption
by each country i divided by total global consumption in month t (assuming
constant consumption share across all 12 months in a given year).
A global consumption-weighted mean implicit net tax is then given by
taxt = (
∑ N
i=1w itpriceit) − benchmarkt at each month t . The most recent Energy
Information Administration data on motor gasoline consumption are from 2012;
we extrapolate consumption shares up to 2015 by assuming that shares (but not
consumption) remain fixed across the 2012–2015 period.
Data availability. The data that support the plots within this paper and other
findings of this study are publicly available on the Harvard Dataverse
at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/mlross.
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